- #Breached plant employees used same teamviewer manual
- #Breached plant employees used same teamviewer password
Anything that extends beyond their borders is guaranteed to Not Happen Soon. Localities have neither the money nor the expertise much less the political will to deal with city utility problems like sewer, water, etc. What is an Open Secret, occasionally trotted out by MSM as a “Oh My!” story, is that much of the infrastructure of the USA is crumbling. These happen regularly and are ho-hum to most media. Physical plant failures such as percolation ponds/dams collapsing.
#Breached plant employees used same teamviewer manual
There are computer, manual control, pumps and gates that can fail. Large MSM media rarely report on these small town incidents unless something spectacular happens. One can hope.įebru10:17 are many incidents at such facilities but they often are either dealt with In House or only rise to the level of Local Public Interest.
Do an internet search on Walkeron water for one example.ĭespite the sensationalism that doesn’t help – increasing people’s anxiety, and directing attention away from the many problems in drinking water infrastructure and operation that do need to be fixed – this incident getting press worldwide might finally put enough attention on the problems for fixes to start getting made.
You also can’t 100% guard against an inside job, whether through malice, hubris or stupidity (I guess the last two are intertwined). There’s no guarantee, of course, that every drinking water plant in the world meets a minimum standard. I would be surprised if the Oldsmar plant was designed, maintained and operated very differently. Water plants won’t pay for pumps or tanks larger than needed to do the job. If it injecting into a holding tank while nothing is being pumped out, to a dangerous point within the tank, there are still safeguards downstream to prevent release of water out of specification. Maybe unpleasant to drink but still not dangerous. At minimum system flow it might be, at the outside, 10x. There might be a backup pump, so now you have maximum of 4x. Pumps are sized at some factor of maximum system flow – say, twice. Just because the screen says so, does not make it so. On the specific point being sensationalized: in no water plant that I have been in (mostly industrial, but some drinking water) would it be physically possible to increase the injection rate of sodium hydroxide over 100x. internet access to water plant networks and equipment. People will reasonably differ about whether some practices should be allowed ex.
There were many things being done wrong or poorly here. Tags: cybersecurity, infrastructure, physical security That is, until this past Monday, when Florida county sheriff Bob Gualtieri held a remarkably clear-headed and fact-filled news conference about an attempt to poison the water supply of Oldsmar, a town of around 15,000 not far from Tampa. Spend a few minutes searching Twitter, Reddit or any number of other social media sites and you’ll find countless examples of researchers posting proof of being able to access so-called “human-machine interfaces”-basically web pages designed to interact remotely with various complex systems, such as those that monitor and/or control things like power, water, sewage and manufacturing plants.Īnd yet, there have been precious few known incidents of malicious hackers abusing this access to disrupt these complex systems.
#Breached plant employees used same teamviewer password
The Florida water treatment facility whose computer system experienced a potentially hazardous computer breach last week used an unsupported version of Windows with no firewall and shared the same TeamViewer password among its employees, government officials have reported.īrian Krebs points out that the fact that we know about this attack is what’s rare: It just doesn’t make sense for Russia to be behind this.ĪrsTechnica is reporting on the poor cybersecurity at the plant: Despite its similarities to a Russian attack of a Ukrainian power plant in 2015, my bet is that it’s a disgruntled insider: either a current or former employee. This could have been fatal to people living downstream, if an alert operator hadn’t noticed the change and reversed it. The attacker took control of one of the systems, and increased the amount of sodium hydroxide-that’s lye-by a factor of 100. Attack against Florida Water Treatment FacilityĪ water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, was attacked last Friday.
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